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Revision of the local public administration system 
March 5, 2003  
 
 
Local public administration system has taken center stage again. It was easy to foresee 
that sooner or later Communist Party would revise local public administration, as it 
was among its key promises made in the parliamentary elections of February 25, 
2001.  
There are enough reasons to believe that other motives than increasing the efficiency 
of the local public administration or meeting Council of Europe standards determined 
Communists to revise the local public administration system, namely inertia in 
changing attitudes towards issues of paramount importance for the country. This 
inertia is very illustrative for the Moldovan political elite as a whole. While in 
opposition the Communist party rejected all the initiatives of the ruling Alliance for 
Democracy and Reforms, including local public administration reform, which was 
implement with the assistance of international organizations. Later on, once acceding 
to power the Communist Party continued the economic reforms initiated by their 
predecessors, which they so much criticized. The fact is that the economic reforms 
have been imposed and coordinated with international monetary organizations IMF 
and WB.  
 
On the contrary, local public administration reform initiated back in 1998 was not 
imposed by the aforesaid organizations, that is why Communist Party is committed to 
fulfil its electoral promise at least as far as the local government is concerned, despite 
any possible shortcomings like the lack of funding or violation of the constitutional 
principle of local autonomy. Presidential Spokesman confirmed this when stated that 
the President would probably not promulgate the Law on Local Public Administration 
before consultations with the Congress of Local and Regional Powers of the Council 
of Europe.  
 
Having said that, let's consider all the events in the chronological order. On November 
6, 1998 the XIV Legislature Parliament adopted the Law no. 186 on the Local Public 
Administration with the majority vote of the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, 
whereas on November 12 passed the Law no. 191 on the Administrative-territorial 
Division of the Republic of Moldova. Under the later, the country was to be divided 
in counties, thus reducing by three times the number of second-level administrative-
territorial units and by 200 the number of first-level units, i.e. mayoralties. In its 
Resolution no. 293 of 02.19.1999 the Parliament set the date for general local 
elections for May 23, 1999. Administrative-territorial reform was to be completed 
after the elections with the formation of public administration bodies at the county 
and local level (municipalities, communes, and villages).  
 
On December 28, 2001 by the majority vote of the Communist faction and several 
independent MPs, the XV Legislature Parliament passed the Law no. 781 on the 
modification and completion of the Law on Local Public Administration. Prior to that 
the Parliament passed a new Law on Administrative-Territorial Division of the 
Republic of Moldova to return to the old administrative-territorial division, i.e. rayons. 
The procedure of mayor election was also changed, under the modifications they were 
to be elected by the local councils. In compliance with the newly adopted law, on 
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February 5, 2002 the Parliament issued Resolution no. 807 on establishing the date for 
general local elections for April 7, 2002. Two weeks later the Constitutional Court  
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outlawed the said Resolution on the grounds it ran counter to the Constitution. Later 
on February 14, in its Resolution no. 13 the Court outlawed several provisions of the 
Law on modification and completion of the Law on Local Public Administration and 
Law on modification of the Electoral Code. The Parliament had to comply and firstly 
suspended the enforcement of the said laws, but later even substantially revised them.  
Simultaneously, opposition in Parliament notified Council of Europe on problems 
related to local government in the Republic of Moldova. In its turn, through its 
specialized bodies Council of Europe recommended Moldovan authorities to 
reconsider the modifications they operated to the electoral and local government laws 
and to submit them for the expertise of the Council of Europe.  
 
Recently, the Parliament amended the Electoral Code and restored all the provisions 
related to the direct election of the mayors by the entire community.  
 
Last week the Parliament commenced examining a new Law on Local Public 
Administration. The new law compiles the majority of 1998 law provisions. 
Consequently the ruling party abandoned the idea of establishing "vertical power".  
 
The main difference between the two laws is that the prefect institution (cornerstone 
of decentralization) is abolished and the procedure of forming local government and 
their prerogatives are changed. Furthermore, the law provides that local government 
shall be formed in line with the new administrative-territorial division.  
 
Although largely criticized by non-governmental organizations working in the field, 
it's very likely that the rayons would be restored no latter than spring-summer. 
Needless to say, a lot of problems are expected to surface upon the enforcement of the 
law. Any reform requires financial, material and human resources. In the last two 
years, the ruling party complained on numerous occasions that it lacked qualified 
people for an efficient state administration. At the central level the problem might be 
partially solved by frequent employees' turnout (until the people devoted to the party 
acquire enough experience). However the same method may not be applied to the 
newly formed local governments (three times exceeding the current number of local 
public administration officers).  
 
To conclude, under given circumstances the only thing opposition and civil society 
can do is to point to the shortcomings, negative impact and high cost of revising local 
public administration system. Noteworthy, the estimations made by the government 
for enforcing the reform differ significantly (5-10 times) from the ones made by the 
non-governmental organizations working in the field. Despite the criticism, there are 
enough reasons to believe that the local public administration system shall be revised 
after all, and neither Council of Europe nor international monetary organizations 
would insist on the contrary. However, it is to be expected that the said organizations 
would react in case the revision hinders the economic growth or is to much burden for 
the state budget. Things would be clarified after general local elections.  
 
As strange as it might seem the ruling party commits itself to an undertaking, i.e. 
revising local public administration, without being 100% certain that it would lead to 
an economic growth. If the reform fails it would inevitably lead to social and later on 
political problems.  
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Transdnestrian conflict solution - a new stage 
March 19, 2003  
 
 
1. New political circumstances  
2. Sanctions impact  
3. Tiraspol's diplomatic victories  
4. The limits of the compromise  
 
 
1. New political circumstances 
 
Albeit a month already passed since the President made public his initiative on 
settling the Transdnistrian conflict via developing a new Constitution jointly with 
Tiraspol administration, the situation is still quite fuzzy. One thing is for sure, 
Moldovan authorities are willing to convert the country into a federation, whereas 
Transdnistrian side to accept the idea in principle. And although, OSCE, EU and US 
have intensified their diplomatic efforts in this respect, the outlines of the would-be 
federation are rather vague.  
 
A change is to be noticed in the style of the media coverage as well, they tend to tailor 
their forecasts and comments to the latest developments and their likely impact on the 
conflict resolution.  
 
Let us consider now the latest developments. It has been repeatedly pointed that this 
sudden interest in Transdnistrian conflict has been determined in the first place by the 
external environment, namely EU and NATO enlargement. One may say that 
Transdnistria's turn has come to take the center stage and be in the spotlight of 
superpowers, i.e. UE and US. Western bureaucratic machinery functions in such a 
manner as center stage matters are seriously dealt with until an acceptable solution is 
reached.  
 
From this perspective, the recently released document "Wider Europe - 
Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbors" of the European Commission opens new perspectives for the Republic of 
Moldova. Besides an outline of the EU polices towards neighborhood countries the 
document also includes a chapter on "Greater EU Political Involvement in Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Management". The chapter points that EU should take a more 
active role to facilitate the settlement of dispute over Transdnistria and engage in 
post-conflict internal security arrangements. The document reads that those actions 
are to be undertaken "in support of the efforts of OSCE and other mediators".  
 
Interestingly enough, another document, namely EU decision on banning Tiraspol 
leaders' access to EU, was made public on February 27, 2003. Greece, currently 
holding EU Presidency announced that Transdnistria leadership, a total of 17 persons 
are banned from entering EU and US due to their "permanent obstructionism and 
refusal to work towards improving the current situation, thus thwarting negotiations 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol".  
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2. Sanctions impact 
 
Apparently, the event has taken Moldovan authorities by surprise, as it took them 
quite a while to react and endorse EU and US stance. On the contrary, Tiraspol 
authorities had an immediate, self-defense reaction, although not quite appropriate. 
Firstly, on March 1, 2003 they appealed to the Russian Embassy to the Republic of 
Moldova for help. The funny thing is that although signed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Transdnistria (pretending to be an independent state) the letter goes on 
explaining that the aforesaid persons are the citizens of the Russia Federation, 
consequently the Embassy Of Russian Federation should defend their rights.  
 
Secondly, the funny thing is Transdnistrian authorities accused UE of applying 
"double standards" on the grounds that on the one hand they allow "Chechen 
terrorists' access on the soil of EU", and on the other ban Transdnistrians' access. This 
time Transdnistrian authorities really blundered, when they couldn't make their mind 
whether to speak up as leaders of an independent state (Transdnestria), or as citizens 
of Russia. During the last 10 years Transdnistrians have skillfully exploited "multiple 
personality syndrome".  
 
Needless to say, Tiraspol leaders compare Transdnistrian and Chechen conflict, 
however only to the extent it is suitable to them. However, others may draw those 
parallels to the end so as to clarify who is after all resorting to "double standards". EU 
is indeed very consistent in its policies, namely insisting on political resolution of the 
conflicts. There was no trial on Chechen leaders and their war crimes have still to be 
proven, however they are not allowed to take part in the political dialogue with 
Russian authorities. The latter prefer, instead, to resort to force and to cooperate with 
the Chechen groups loyal to them.  
 
On the other hand, the case of Transdnistria is totally different, i.e. the breakaway 
leaders are sanctioned for obstructing the negotiations with Moldovan authorities, that 
are endorsed by the mediator and guarantor countries.  
 
It was supposed that under panic, Transdnistrian authorities forgot that their appeals 
to Russia might not only lead to confusions and misinterpretations but also may 
tarnish the image of the guarantor country itself. For one thing, Russian press has 
recently followed the issue of "double standards" from a totally different perspective, 
i.e. Russia was fighting secessionism on its own territory, while it encouraged it in 
Moldova and Georgia. There is another reason why it was dangerous to compare 
Transdnistria and Chechnya, Council of Europe is considering establishing a War 
Crime Tribunal on Chechnya. Although it is not clear yet if this would really happen, 
Russians still have enough reasons to worry. Furthermore, 4 judges of the European 
Court for Human Rights are on a visit in Chisinau to determine, among others, what 
was Russian Army's involvement in the 1992 Transdnistrian military conflict. This is 
another reason why the comparison with Chechnya was inappropriate.  
 
Russian authorities had a reserved but adequate reaction. In an attempt to preserve 
their influence on the breakaway region, official representative of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, Aleksandr Iakovenko, stated "Russia pleads for handling very carefully the 
ban for Transdnistrian leaders' travel to EU". This rather diplomatic wording was 
aimed firstly to defend Russian citizens who established a breakaway regime on the  
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soil of the Republic of Moldova and secondly to warn the guarantor countries on the 
pitfalls of such decisions, in particular over obstruction of the negotiation process.  
 
Noteworthy, Ukrainian authorities endorsed the ban on Transdnistrian leaders' travel 
to EU and US. Furthermore, under the pressure of the EU, now they are willing to 
recognize and observe customs requirements of the Republic of Moldova, under 
which Transdnistrian goods would cross the Ukrainian border only if bearing the 
customs seal of the Republic of Moldova. If this happens, Transdnistria would loose 
the main vantage in claiming an equal status to the Republic of Moldova, or its reason 
d'etre as an independent state.  
 
 
3. Tiraspol's diplomatic victories 
 
Albeit the conjuncture became more favorable to Chisinau, Tiraspol leaders have 
proven on numerous occasions that they have numerous diplomatic resources to their 
asset and are able to covert them into propagandistic achievements. Since OSCE 
made public its federalization plan, the model of the federation to be chosen has been 
at issue, as have been the prerogatives of the center and its subjects. So far Tiraspol 
leaders have managed to get ahead of Moldovan side by convincing guarantor 
countries and OSCE to sign draft agreements suitable for them only. Later on they 
announced that "the entire international community endorses resolution of the 
Transdnistrian conflict, except for the obstructionist Chisinau".  
 
This was the case on December 5, 2002 on the eve of Porto Summit, when 
Transdnistrian authorities, together with OSCE and guarantor countries signed draft 
Agreement on the so-called "contractual federation". Another example is the Protocol 
on the mechanism of working out and adopting the Constitution of the federative state 
released on February 28. Again guarantor countries and OSCE endorsed the 
document, which Chisinau refused to sign. Needless to say there is no mention in the 
Protocol of the draft Agreement developed by President Voronin, an alternative to the 
Protocol. Moreover, clear recommendations from the President Voronin's Agreement 
have been replaced by very loose and vague ones in the Transdnistrian Protocol. This 
was probably done to enable Transdnistrian side to better negotiate the principle of 
"equality of the parties", which it has been promoting. For instance, under the 
Transdnistrian Protocol the Constitutional Commission to be established would start 
its activity by defining some principles already provided for in the Chisinau's 
Agreement. Again, the reason for these changes might be to break the deadlines set by 
Moldovan authorities for settling the conflict, namely by the next parliamentary 
elections. Good thinking from Transdnistrian side, as being in a shortage of time 
Moldovan authorities would be more willing to make significant concessions.  
 
It is worth mentioning that mediators stated on numerous occasions they would 
endorse any proposal both parties would agree with. Having said that it is not clear 
why OSCE and guarantor countries endorse documents not signed by Moldova. For 
instance guarantor countries and OSCE refrained from signing the draft Agreement 
worked out by Moldovan authorities two weeks earlier, although this document was 
apparently chosen as a basis for future negotiations. Obviously, Moldovan diplomacy 
has failed to convince mediators to sign the Agreement launched by President 
Voronin. To achieve a balance, Moldovan diplomats may want to pursue mediators to  
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endorse only the documents already signed by the Republic of Moldova, or those 
signed by both parties to the conflict.  
 
 
4. The limits of the compromise 
 
Under given circumstances new grounds for compromise are being sought. Chisinau 
could not afford to be too optimistic, even if the recent developments seem to be on 
its side. And this because Republic of Moldova still heavily relies on Russia's energy 
and distribution markets, which in the long run makes Chisinau politically dependent.  
 
Albeit OSCE draft Agreement of July 3, 2002 and President Voronin Agreement 
released on February 14 outline the principles for edifying a federative state, the 
principles of negotiation are still unclear. Transdnistrian leaders continue to insist on a 
"contractual federation" based on the "equality of the parties" stipulated in the 
Memorandum of May 8, 1997.  
 
Meanwhile, EU and US decision to ban Transdnistria's leaders travel as well as many 
decisions to follow on the export of goods indicate that the parties are not equal. 
Furthermore, it is for the first time that sanctions have been applied to Tiraspol and 
they actually proved to be effective in determining Tiraspol to make concessions, in 
particular regarding the withdrawal of the Russian munitions from the region. One 
may say, this is an expression of goodwill from Tiraspol authorities, an attempt to 
avoid other sanctions in the future. In fact they stated that the sanctions were nothing 
but "inertia effect" from the time negotiations were at a deadlock. However, it is clear 
now that Chisinau does not object such inertia effects.  
 
Moldovan authorities may want to clarify what other sanctions could be imposed on 
Tiraspol and to what extent they would determine further concessions, however so as 
not to affect the negotiations or displease Russia. In fact during his last meeting with 
President Voronin, Vladimir Putin insisted on granting Transdnistria a "reliably 
guaranteed status". This is a rather broad scope, but trespassing it would cause 
considerable economic problems to Chisinau. That is why, in the negotiations that 
have resumed this week all these grounds would be tried out.  
 
According to some experts, the next sanction might be "freezing personal bank 
accounts" of the Tiraspol leaders. In fact, nobody knows if such accounts really exist. 
Last year Transdnistrian press reported that the highest official's salary amounts to 
$150. However the incident in Vienna airport, when Igor Smirnov was detained for 
several hours leads us to idea that after all, Transdnistrian leaders have an interest in 
travelling to the West.  
 
Indeed these are just speculations aimed to prove that behind the pretended modesty 
displayed by Transdnistrian authorities lie their obscure economic interests. 
Undermining those interests might determine Tiraspol leaders to give up their hopes 
on the regime that they had established.  
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If we were to assess the opportunities and risks in the conflict settlement, we would 
find out that they are balanced. Indeed, the changes in EU policies towards 
neighborhood countries may provide a good opportunity for the Republic of Moldova 
to make public its stance and actually impose it, although it was previously ignored by 
the guarantor countries mainly preoccupied with their own interests. Having said that, 
Moldova may count that guarantor countries would agree on granting Transdnistria 
the prerogatives ranging between those Crimea enjoys within Ukraine and those of 
Russian Federation subjects. Experts claim that the efficiency of one model or another 
may be tested only when applied in practice. However the guarantor countries should 
not insist on models they themselves refrain from using.  
 
In this respect the proposal of the Russian Ambassador to Moldova seems rather 
interesting, namely working out the federative Constitution of the Republic of 
Moldova based on the Constitution of Chechnya, especially as far the citizenship of 
the federation subject is concerned. Nevertheless, this proposal might work only when 
the Constitution of the federation subject, i.e. Transdnistria, would be developed. As 
for the federative Constitution of the Republic of Moldova it has to include the same 
basic principles the Russian Federation Constitution does. This refers in particular to 
vertical structure of the law enforcement structures (Justice, Prosecutor Office etc), 
army, finance, customs, etc. In fact draft Agreement developed by President Voronin 
provides for all this. As for the citizenship, Article 2 of the Russian Federation should 
be referred to, providing that Russian citizenship is "unitary and equal". 
Consequently, if we are to rely on Russian experience than provisions from both 
federal and federation subjects legislation should be applied accordingly in the case of 
Moldova.  
 
Going back to the risks, they are considerable as well. Even if the "diplomatic and 
economic blockade" of Tiraspol regime was to succeed, Russian authorities have 
already pledged to recompense Transdnistria for not obstructing its munitions 
withdrawal from the region. This compensation might be sufficient for keeping alive 
Tiraspol regime up until Chisinau authorities would run short of time, on the eve of 
parliamentary elections. Furthermore, one may not rule out that economic pressure 
would be exercised on Chisinau as well, so as to determine it to make concessions as 
far as the "reliable guaranteed status" for Transdnistria is concerned.  
 
One way or another, future developments in the upcoming months would be rather 
turbulent.  
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2003 local elections 
March 31, 2003  
 
 
On March 20 the Parliament set the date for general local elections, i.e. May 25. 
Under the election law, the "electoral period" commences immediately the election 
date is set. Firstly, during the electoral campaign rayon and local electoral districts are 
established. Secondly, rayon, city and village electoral councils are established. In 
addition, Central Electoral Commission shall develop jointly with the Audiovisual 
Council "Concept of election coverage in mass media". Only after electoral councils 
are established will the contestants be able to register and engage fully in the electoral 
race. CEC has already made public the list of 26 political parties eligible to run in 
elections.  
 
Furthermore, CEC proceeded to the registration of electoral blocs, it already 
registered "Moldova Noastra" (Our Moldova) Social-Liberal Alliance Electoral Bloc 
formed by the Social Democratic Alliance, headed by former Prime Minister Dumitru 
Braghis, Independent's Alliance headed by incumbent Chisinau Mayor Serafim 
Urechean; and Liberal Party headed by Veaceslav Untila. The leaders of the newly 
established electoral bloc stated that one of its primary goals in the long run is the 
formation of a joint political party. Apparently, Serafim Urechean would lead the 
bloc. He already made public his intention to run again for the Mayor position. 
Experts believe the major stake in the upcoming elections would be the mayoralty of 
the Chisinau Municipality. Serafim Urechean has pretty high chances to win. 
However, it is very unlikely that he would win from the first round. In local elections 
of May 23, 1999 Ureachean was able to win in the first round only because he had 
been backed by Alliance for Democracy and Reform coalition holding the majority 
seats in Parliament. Further, the leadership of the National TV backed and 
electioneered for him extensively. An evidence to this were the numerous complaints 
submitted in this respect to the CEC. However, this time the context has changed 
significantly, Urechean has become an easy target for the authorities. Nevertheless, 
"Our Moldova" may count on good results in elections.  
 
At the end of the week the formation of a new bloc was made public, formed by the 
Social-Democratic Party and Social-Liberal Party, called PSD&PSL Bloc. 
Presumably the newly formed bloc would be a long-term one, for one thing 
"electoral" does not appear in its title. The bloc would most likely face the same 
identity crisis as "Our Moldova" Bloc, as it also declares itself to be of liberal and 
social-democratic orientation. PSD&PSL Bloc could count on the votes of Party of 
Democratic Forces' elevated electorate, which was quite stable for five electoral 
campaigns, as was the Christian-Democrats' one. This electorate of Party of 
democratic Forces had been scattered in the 2001 parliamentary elections due to 
denigration and libel campaign against the party leader, Valeriu Matei, accused of 
being involved in some corruption scandals, albeit none of the said allegations was 
proven later on. Presumably, after the merger of the Party of Democratic Forces with 
Social-Liberal Party at least a part of the former' electorate (accounting for 9%) would 
be recovered, whereas the alliance with the Social-Democratic Party would enable the 
newly established bloc to pass the threshold of representation in 2005 parliamentary 
elections.  
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Domestic press claims that the PSD&PSL Bloc may designate Viorel Topa, Former 
Director of the Banca de Economii (Savings Bank) as its candidate for the Chisinau 
Mayoralty. Viorel Topa is known as a good expert in finances.  
 
Other political parties are currently in the negotiation stage in view of establishing 
new electoral blocs. On the right wing, front-line Christian-Democratic People's Party 
announced that the formation of a single right-wing electoral bloc had failed. That is 
why, Christian-Democrats who have a very stable and disciplined electorate might 
form an electoral bloc with another 4-5 small parties. It is unlikely that Christian-
Democrats would benefit much from those parties, however the establishment of a 
Christian-Democratic bloc might eventually determine those small parties to merge 
with the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party, thus aiding right-wing electorate in 
making their choice in elections.  
 
Christian-Democratic leader confirmed the forecasts made earlier one by domestic 
analysts with regard to designation of Vlad Cubreacov as the party candidate to the 
Chisinau Mayoralty. Last year, amidst protest rallies, enigmatic kidnapping and not a 
less enigmatic reappearance, Vlad Cubreacov has become a very popular public 
figure, especially in the capital city. Christian-Democrats enjoyed a steady 12% rating 
in Chisinau even before the protest rallies however, they may count that their 
positions have strengthened ever since.  
 
So far, it is difficult to predict whether other electoral blocs would be established. As 
for the left wing, a political alliance has already been formed. Nevertheless, the 10 
political parties, which established Center-Left Union, announced they would not run 
jointly in the upcoming local elections. Obviously the leader of the Union is 
Communist Party, whose rating, according to some opinion polls, has been steadily 
growing lately. It is expected that the Communist Party would win in almost all rayon 
electoral districts. Consequently, Communist Party has all the grounds to go alone in 
race, as it did in the previous 2001 parliamentary elections. Allegedly, the party would 
designate Vasile Zgardan, Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications to run 
for the mayoralty, as he is known as a good manager with extensive administrative 
experience. Zgardan is not member of Communist Party, but being designated by CP, 
Zgardan might well compete with the Social-Liberal Alliance's, Serafim Urechean. 
Anyway, experts agree that elections outcome would be decided in the second round, 
and Serafim Urechean and Vasile Zgardan are the most likely candidates to dispute 
the mayor seat.  
 
Democratic Party leader, Dumirtu Diacov, also Center-Left Union Coordinator, stated 
that he would rather his party went alone in the upcoming elections. In such a case the 
party prospects aren't so bright, albeit it's impressive number skillful administrators. 
And this because of the party's poor performance in the last parliamentary elections 
when it pooled only 5%.  
 
Each of the 8 parties members of the Center-Left Union have a very low rating, less 
than 2%. This has lead experts to the idea that those parties joined the Union in 
attempt to survive on the political arena, nevertheless this desperate move might 
prove to have an opposite effect. Firstly, the parties would have to constantly prove 
their loyalty towards their main coalition partner, i.e. Communist Party and refrain 
from any kind of criticism. Under those circumstances the said parties wouldn't be  
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able to devise and carry out an efficient electioneering campaign on the left spectrum. 
Noteworthy, the Union set 3 major goals: reunification of the country by settling 
Transdnistrian conflict; working out a new federative Constitution; promoting 
European integration of the Republic of Moldova. It is up to the Communist Party 
whether those objectives would be achieved or not, the rest of the parties having little 
saying in this matter. It goes without saying that voters may endorse those objectives 
by casting their vote in favor of the Communist Party, without the intermediary of the 
8 small parties.  
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The Referendum in Transdnistria 
April 15, 2003  
 
 
1. The results of the referendum  
2. How was the referendum perceived in Chisinau  
3. Fluctuating circumstances and the results of the referendum  
4. The propagandistic potential of the "lost" referendum  
 
 
1. The results of the referendum 
 
On 6 April 2003, the "constitutional referendum on the introduction of the private 
ownership of land" was held in the Transdnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. 
On 7 April 2003, the Transdnistrian Central Electoral Commission ruled the 
referendum invalid according to the preliminary results. 153,140 voters took part in 
the referendum, which were only 38.92% of the overall number of voters, while the 
local law required a 50% turnout for the results of the referendum to be validated.  
 
Of those who did take part in it, 52% voted for the introduction of the private 
ownership of land, whereas 44% opposed the proposed constitutional endorsement.  
 
Beyond doubt, the results of the referendum represent a special phenomenon. This is 
because ever since the secessionist regime in Transdnistria exists there has been no 
precedents of the Transdnistrian authorities not getting their proposals approved. The 
low turnout has been explained by the fact that the organisers of the referendum did 
not have enough time to explain to the citizens the importance of voting for the 
private ownership of land. This could be a plausible explanation, more so as the 
agitation campaign in favour of private ownership of land started as late as February. 
In any case, there's still a lot of vagueness about the whole thing.  
 
 
2. How was the referendum perceived in Chisinau 
 
On 4 April, on the eve of the referendum, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Moldova (CPM) called upon the citizens of Transdnistria via the government 
media to vote against the privatisation of land, giving as example the unfortunate 
experience of "poorly thought and rushed privatisation of land on the right bank of the 
Dniestr River".  
 
After the preliminary results of the referendum were made public, the CPM Central 
Committee expressed satisfaction at the fact that the "inhabitants of Transdnistria 
have demonstrated responsibility in the referendum". To the CPM, the option of the 
Transdnistrians was a clear "NO" to the issue, and so it was to the very idea of 
holding it.  
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This was clearly an attempt to promote the idea that the Transdnistrians follow the 
CPM Central Committee rather than their authorities in Tiraspol. Probably, this 
particular case should have shown that, generally, things in Transdnistria change in a 
manner that the Transdnistrian authorities lose control over the Transdnistrian public 
opinion.  
 
Indeed, one could believe that the ruling party in Moldova won one battle in the 
propaganda war that it is leading with Tiraspol. However, things are more 
complicated than that, and are determined by the fluctuating political circumstances.  
 
 
3. Fluctuating circumstances and the results of the referendum 
 
Under the current circumstances, the most important question is whether the 
Transdnistrian authorities really wanted their citizens to vote on the issue of land 
ownership. It could have been the case that the recent event took place because the 
Tiraspol elite itself was not so certain of how worthwhile it was to promote their 
proposal to introduce the private ownership of land.  
 
Such assumptions are well founded. Firstly, one should not overlook the fact that the 
Transdnistrian regime was established as a "fortress for the preservation of Soviet 
values" during the collapse of the USSR. From this perspective, there is no doubt that 
there is a lot of ideological affinity and commonality of political and economic views 
between the current ruling party in Moldova and the Transdnistrian leaders. To 
believe that the Transdnistrian elite, who practically has not changed over the past 15 
years, shares firm liberal views would be a major blunder. Rather, one can presuppose 
that the Transdnistrian leaders, just like the communists in Moldova, have to abide by 
the new economic and political circumstances shaped from the outside. Thus, the 
current Moldovan authorities carry on the economic policies initiated by the previous 
"democratic" governments, which the former so vehemently criticised while in 
opposition.  
 
A telling example is the discrepancy between the views expressed in the recent 
address by the CPM Central Committee to Transdnistrians and the joint statement by 
presidents George Bush and Vladimir Voronin during the latter's visit to Washington 
last December, in which the two Presidents "acknowledge the progress made by 
Moldova in its transition to the market economy, notably in the agricultural sector."  
 
The same is characteristic of the Transdnistrian authorities who in the last few years 
have been concerned with the issue of redistributing the property in the region. They 
kept no secret of the motives behind their proposal to legalise the private ownership of 
land. They put forward both political and economic arguments, such as, for instance, 
the fact that agriculture contributed only 1.5% towards the Transdnistrian budget and 
is collapsing due to the lack of investments which cannot happen as long as private 
ownership of land is not legalised.  
 
More revealing are the political arguments published by the Transdnistrian official 
news-agency "Olvia Press", which said that from the perspective of the efforts at 
conflict resolution through federalisation imposed from outside it is important that the 
ownership of property and land, which are major strategic resources, should be  
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assigned to the Transdnistrian citizens, so that after the resolution of the 
Transdnistrian conflict the central federal authorities could not claim property in the 
region.  
 
It seems obvious that the momentary uncertainty of the political future of the 
Transdnistrian elite, caused by the pressure from the outside to solve the secessionist 
conflict through the federalisation of Moldova, forced the regional authorities to 
initiate in early 2003 the referendum on the issue of land ownership.  
 
Meanwhile, after the referendum was declared, a number of important changes 
occurred which introduced more clarity and optimism as to the future of the 
Transdnistrian regime and its current elite. We could refer principally to the statement 
by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin who insisted to "grant 
Transdnistria a properly guaranteed status" when he met the Moldovan president 
Voronin in February 2003. The visits to Moscow in February 2003 of the 
Transdnistrian leaders have had extremely encouraging results for them as well. The 
Russian deputy Foreign Minister Veaceslav Trubnikov, for example, stated as a result 
that "Russia is seeking an arrangement that would include military guarantees for the 
resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict". Russia has even started negotiations with 
Ukraine and the OSCE on "military guarantees" for the resolution of the conflict. Yet, 
the most impressive has been the statement by Aleksandr Novojilov, Special 
Ambassador of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Committee for Political 
and Security issues of the European Union. He said "Russia does not intend to leave 
its citizens living on the banks of Dniestr River on their own". Other Russian officials 
made encouraging statements of economic nature for the Tiraspol authorities in 
relation to possible financial compensations for the withdrawal of Russian munitions 
and weapons from Transdnistria.  
 
Things have taken a very dangerous turn in this sense, a situation heralded by the 
particularly harsh public statements made recently by Mark Tcaciuk, the political 
adviser to the president, with regard to the Russian officials' actions in support of the 
Transdnistrians. This has been an almost incredible development, if one takes into 
account the fact that the current Moldovan authorities show off their strategic 
partnership with Russia on any occasion, but also the fact that after the reshuffling of 
the presidential administration in the summer 2002 the presidential advisers 
categorically refrained from any political declarations on any sort of political issue.  
 
Other contingency factors are as important, but the Moldovan leaders seem to have 
lacked the courage to explore them, unlike Azerbaidjan, Georgia and Ukraine did 
during the Iraq crisis. At present, the Russian authorities are amazed at Georgia's 
partnership with the US, as if they do not know who was the one to encourage 
separatism on Georgian soil. Thus, in the new regional situation that emerged in the 
aftermath of the Iraq war, Moldova is the only CIS state where Russia still can be a 
regional power able to impose its will, which thing Russia will continue to do given 
the coming presidential and parliamentary elections there.  
 
After so many positive signs and statements by the "main guarantor", the Tiraspol 
administration simply could not help it. The first thing they did was to take vengeance 
on the Moldovan authorities for the latter's call upon the EU and the USA to ban entry 
of Transdnistrian authorities on their territories. The Transdnistrian authorities reacted  
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by declaring 14 highest Moldovan officials personae non grata on Transdnistrian soil. 
This move had an obviously mocking message, the text of the document reiterating 
almost literally the text of the Moldovan authorities' letter to the EU and the USA, and 
its asymmetric nature was a hint to the model of asymmetric federation proposed by 
President Voronin. Moreover, they overturned a major propaganda act put up by the 
Chisinau authorities, namely the attendance by President Voronin of the football 
match between the Moldovan and Dutch teams within the European Championship 
preliminaries, which took place on a stadium in Transdnistria.  
 
Politics is a practical thing, and President Voronin wanted to attend the match in his 
quality of "main supporter" of the national team of Moldova, formed by players from 
both sides of Dniestr. Voronin was prevented from attending, and the administration 
in Chisinau was shown once over how certain of themselves the leaders in Tiraspol 
are, despite their statements that the Transdnistrian region is going through an 
extremely difficult time due to the "economic and diplomatic blockades imposed by 
Chisinau".  
 
The reasons behind Tiraspol's provocative behaviour clearly stand out: their 
confidence in Russia's backing.  
 
From this point of view, it seems obvious that the Transdnistrian authorities did not 
need to promote their own initiative to hold the referendum on land ownership, which 
they felt they had to launch during a time of great incertitude for them. The Tiraspol 
leaders know very well the significance of the issue of land ownership in an 
authoritarian regime. At the same time, for political and image reasons, it was 
misplaced to cancel the referendum. Therefore, it seems that the Transdnistrian 
authorities let it happen "at God's will", so that later they can get the most of its 
propagandistic character. Hence, what in Chisinau was viewed as the defeat of 
Transdnistrian leaders could soon bring completely unexpected results.  
 
 
4. The propagandistic potential of the "lost" referendum 
 
One can suppose that if the Transdnistrian authorities truly wanted the results of the 
referendum to be validated, they would have taken the necessary efforts, and the 
participation rate would have been close to the one in the referendum in Chechnya, 
where almost 96% of the voters showed up for the poll.  
 
Indeed, it is extremely suspect that under extremely difficult economic circumstances 
the Transdnistrian leaders have engaged in a costly political venture, which, above all, 
supposedly revealed their lack of control over the public opinion in the region.  
 
Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the results of the referendum bear a huge 
propagandistic potential for the regional authorities. Firstly, 52% or the absolute 
majority of citizens who took part in the poll opted for the private ownership of land. 
Interestingly, the majority of those who took part in the poll were rural inhabitants, 
who are affected directly by the issue of land ownership. This result could help the 
authorities, if necessary, to attract investors in the region speculating on the fact that 
the region is much more advanced and ready for economic reforms than generally 
thought.  
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Secondly, it is significant that the Transdnistrian regime created a "democratic" 
precedent of holding a referendum, which did not endorse their would be proposal. 
With regional elections in October 2003 in the autonomous entity Gagauz Yeri in the 
background, and the propaganda methods used by the Moldovan authorities in the 
current electoral campaign, the Transdnistrian referendum appears as an example of 
expression of citizens' free will.  
 
Given that in about 10 months we will be called to a referendum to decide the 
adoption of the Moldovan federal constitution, one can easily understand that the 
recent Transdnistrian referendum was a "general rehearsal" and that the story with the 
unexpected outcome of the democratic vote could repeat. Certainly, this could 
happened if, subject to outside pressure, the Constitutional Board joining 
representatives of Chisinau and Tiraspol drafts a federal Constitution which the 
Tiraspol leaders will not like.  
 
For the Transdnistrians to be certain that they can block the adoption of a Constitution 
that they do not like, it is necessary for the referendums to be held in Moldova and 
Transdnistria separately.  
 
It seems that things will evolve according to this very scenario. On 4 April 2003 the 
Moldovan Parliament adopted hastily and with little debate the "Protocol on the 
establishment of the mechanisms of adoption of the federal Constitution". The 
Protocol mentions only the fact that "the text of the Constitution will be developed by 
a joint Moldovan-Transdnistrian Board, which will guarantee full participation to the 
parties' representatives, and will be observed by experts from the guarantor states 
(Russia and Ukraine), OSCE and other international observers". The Protocol 
provides that the referendum on the adoption of the Constitution be held no later than 
1 February 2004, and the elections to the Federal bodies before 25 February 2005. 
Curiously, the Protocol does not include any reference to the principles according to 
which the federal Constitution is to elaborated. Even more curious is the fact that the 
Protocol refers only to the "obligation of the Moldovan and Transdnistrian leaders to 
guarantee all necessary condition for the holding of the referendum according to the 
OSCE and Council of Europe standards", but says nothing of the method of 
organising it, whether it will be in a single national circumscription or in two 
circumscriptions, that is in Moldova and Transdnistria separately.  
 
At the same time, on 9 April 2003 the Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol adopted a similar 
paper, which in its very title specifies that the referendum is about the establishment 
of a "federation on contractual basis", invoking the Declaration of Intent of 5 
December 2002 signed by the guarantor states, the OSCE and Transdnistria, but not 
Moldova. It is difficult to grasp the meaning that the Tiraspol leaders ascribe to the 
term "contractual federation". Yet, there is no doubt that they mean the principle of 
"the equality of parties", which principle would help them argue that the referendum 
is held separately in the two "equal subjects". Otherwise, this will be a breach of the 
principle of the "equality of parties", given that the electorate of Moldova is five to six 
times larger than the Transdnistrian one. Then, if the referendums are held separately, 
the results of Transdnistrians' "freely expressed vote" could be very similar to the 
ones registered on 6 April 2003.  
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The 2003 Electoral Campaign 
April 25, 2003  
 
 
There's one month left until the local elections of 25 May 2003. Practically, most of 
the practical work of preparation for the elections has already been done. The Central 
Electoral Commission (CEC) has succeeded in persuading the government to allot 
another 1.9 million Lei in addition to the previously allotted 7.5 million. This addition 
has been due to the fact that mayors will be elected in the same manner as the local 
councilors, by direct vote and not indirectly as was previously provided. Thus, the 
overall budget for the ongoing electoral campaign amounts to 9.4 million Lei. The 
electoral districts and district electoral councils (in districts, municipalities, towns, 
villages/communes) have been established in due time, and so have the 1987 precincts 
and their bureaus.  
 
The CEC has adopted decisions of major importance on the threshold of electoral 
spending for contestants, the conception and regulation on the coverage of the 
electoral campaign in the mass media, and on monitoring of elections by local and 
foreign observers to be accredited by the respective electoral bodies and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the sample voting ballots for the election of mayors 
and councilors of both levels have been approved, and they which differ 
correspondingly. In all, 898 mayors and 11,843 district, town, municipal, 
village/commune councilors are to be elected.  
 
At present, one can state that the first stage of the electoral period is over, and that the 
second one, the electoral campaigns of electoral contestants, has in fact started. 30 
days before the election day, the term for registration of contestants for mayors, local 
and district councilors elapsed. The district councils have one more week to examine 
the documents submitted for contestants' registration.  
 
Of the 26 political parties registered in Moldova, only 18 have registered to date their 
electoral symbols to be printed on ballots. Of the 10 parties that created the Centre-
Left Union in February 2003 led by the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM), seven 
have entered the electoral race individually. Other six opposition parties of centre-left 
and centre-right orientation have formed the electoral bloc Social Liberal Alliance 
"Our Moldova", led by the Mayor of Chisinau Serafim Urechean. Two other parties of 
similar orientation have joined in the electoral bloc Social Democratic Party - Social 
Liberal Party. An important role in the current campaign is being played by People's 
Christian Democratic Party, which represents the right opposition. They have initially 
called upon all opposition parties to run as a single opposition bloc, but after this 
initiative has failed, they refrained from forming any electoral blocs with small 
opposition parties.  
 
Thus, the ruling party will compete with six potential political partners from the 
Centre-Left Union and as much as three "oppositions" of various standing, which still 
have accounts to settle among themselves.  
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The behaviour of parties in these elections sheds light on the fact that in the Moldovan 
political party system four major political groupings can be distinguished, which are 
likely to continue to stand out in the local political arena after the May elections.  
 
Although the Republic of Moldova is experiencing its 7th electoral campaign held in 
conditions of political pluralism, the issues and major scandals related to the current 
campaign are prompted by the same factors: the behaviour of the state mass media, 
the use of the administrative leverage by the contestants and representatives of the 
ruling CPM, the intimidation of contestants from opposition parties, the obscure 
funding of electoral contestants' campaign. Each of these factors deserves special 
monitoring and detailed analysis, which is being done by the CEC, the electoral 
contestants themselves and a number of non-governmental organisations.  
 
The current local elections have an extremely high political stake, although, 
theoretically, they should be just "administrative elections".  
 
Firstly, these elections are for the bodies of the local administration system, which 
recently has been radically changed. There is no doubt that the revision of the local 
public administration system has been part of the ruling party's efforts at building the 
"vertical axis of state power". Testimony to this is the insistence with which the 
current government has promoted this idea by trying to hold early local elections last 
year, a proposal that was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.  
 
Secondly, President Voronin has been involved in the current campaign. During the 
ceremony of deposing flowers to the monument to Lenin for his 133rd anniversary, 
Voronin, President of Moldova and Chairman of the CPM, said that "at present, CPM 
main task is to strengthen the party and keep it in power. The CPM must do 
everything to win the mayoralty of the capital Chisinau in the local elections 
scheduled for 25 May 2003". This development has reminded the public opinion of a 
similar case two years ago when the opposition parties turned to the Constitutional 
Court to rule on whether holding the office of the President of Moldova is 
constitutionally compatible with holding the chairmanship of a political party, 
obviously referring to Voronin's case. The Constitutional Court decided back then that 
it was not in its competence to rule on that issue. As a result, at present one cannot 
distinguish when President Vladimir Voronin represents the interests of all Moldovan 
citizens from when he represents the interests of the party that he's chairing.  
 
It is true that the previous Moldovan Presidents, Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi, 
got involved in the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary electoral campaigns, when the 
former supported the Democratic Agrarian Party and the latter - the Bloc for a 
Democratic and Prosperous Moldova. Moreover, Mircea Snegur even went the length 
of creating and chairing a political party during his presidential term, and thus set a 
precedent in the current constitutional setting. Therefore, even though the reproach to 
the CPM is well founded, it has no effects due to the precedents created by the two 
former Moldovan Presidents. This is how the foundations for the practice of "transfer 
of authority" from top public figures to candidates for deputies were laid. Still, the 
former presidents Snegur and Lucinschi never got involved directly in the electoral 
campaigns for local authorities, and so President Voronin is a groundbreaker in this 
sense.  
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Thirdly, the opposition press itself perceives the current local elections as a major 
political battle between the "leftovers" of democratic forces and the current ruling 
party, which is being accused of trying to build an authoritarian regime in Moldova.  
 
Public opinion polls and local analysts have indicated that the highest chances in the 
electoral battle for the mayor of Chisinau belong to the CPM candidate Vasile 
Zgardan, currently Minister of Transports and Telecommunications, and Serafim 
Urechean, incumbent mayor of Chisinau and leader of the electoral bloc Social 
Liberal Alliance "Our Moldova". The opposition press, which supports the latter, has 
written that the outcome of Urechean's electoral battle with the communist candidate 
is crucial for the future of the democratisation process in Moldova. Allegedly, an 
eventual defeat of the communist candidate would set a precedent of enormous 
demoralising potential for the communists.  
 
The representatives of the other two opposition parties are of a different opinion. They 
believe that the two top candidates are equally abusive in that they both make 
extensive use of the "administrative leverage" they hold, although to various extents. 
The communist candidate has at his disposal the entire central administration, 
including the ministry led by him, the State Radio and TV company, the 
governmental newspapers "Moldova Suverana" (Sovereign Moldova) and 
"Nezavisimaia Moldova" (Independent Moldova) etc. At the same time, the mayor of 
Chisinau is being accused of abusing, to the detriment of other electoral candidates, 
the media services of the municipal concern, which includes the TV station EuroTV, 
the radio station "Antena C", and the newspaper "Capitala" (The Capital).  
 
Since the political stake of the current local elections is so high, the tools used are up 
to fit it. At this stage, one can judge about the committed abuses by the nature of 
complaints that the electoral contestants have filed with the CEC. These refer most 
often to the abuse by public authorities and their media outlets in trying to manipulate 
the public opinion and defame Serafim Urechean, who is the main counter-candidate 
of the communists in Chisinau.  
 
The other counter-candidates in Chisinau are probably counting on some sort of 
political gain resulting from the fight between the two top candidates. Indeed, the 
Chisinau Mayor, Serafim Urechean, deserves all support in his resistance to all sort of 
overt accusations at him. Yet, on the other hand, another part of the opposition parties 
remember well that in the previous local elections four years ago, Urechean himself 
abusively enjoyed governmental support, which fact was noted in the CEC decisions 
of 1999. One may say that Urechean is now the victim of the electoral abuses that he 
himself once helped embed.  
 
In conclusion, the main characteristics of the electoral process are the following: 
abuses by those in government and revenge by those who proceed them, from one 
election to another, over and over again. The specific feature of the current campaign, 
though, is that the extent of abuses being committed is beyond any limit.  
 
In this sense, there are examples, which can be easily qualified as intimidation by 
authorities of electoral contestants and the people close to them. This could go as far 
as arrests of candidates or of their subordinates at work etc.  
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Confessions made public by high police officers who said that, in this campaign, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs executes the political order to prevent the current mayor 
of Chisinau from being re-elected point to the fact that the Republic of Moldova is 
going through the dirtiest electoral campaign since 1994.  
 
These examples show that the electoral climate in Moldova has considerably 
deteriorated, which fact has already been indicated by local and foreign observers 
with regard to the elections for the governor of the Gagauz Yeri autonomous entity. It 
is extremely sad that such things happen now after both specialised OSCE institutions 
(ODIHR), throughout years, have considered that to date elections in Moldova have 
been relatively free and fair, the same being said in the joint declaration of the 
Presidents Bush and Voronin of December 2002. It happens so that the very public 
authorities, who in their statements have repeatedly called for efforts to improve 
Moldova's image externally, are now risking to affect in the most dangerous way the 
external image of Moldova through their own actions.  
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Electoral Statistics 
12 May 2003  
 
 
The electoral campaign for the election of local public administrations has stepped 
into its final stage. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has published the data 
on the number of candidates put up by the electoral contestants, who will compete for 
mandates of mayors and councillors in local (village, town and municipality) and 
raion (district) councils.  
 
In all, 930 electoral districts have been set up, of which 32 are raion districts, 3 
municipal, 51 town, and 844 village. No electoral district has been set up in the 
secessionist region of Transdnistria. According to the Law on the Territorial and 
Administrative Organisation of Moldova, in Transdnistria there are 148 localities 
including two municipalities (Bender and Tiraspol), 9 towns (both including another 
two localities) and 69 villages (communes including another 64 rural settlements). In 
all these places, the general local elections of 25 May 2003 will not be held according 
to the electoral laws of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
The poll is to elect 898 mayors in three municipalities, 51 towns and 844 villages 
(communes). In addition, 11,935 councillors are to be elected in 32 districts (1,036 
councillors), 3 municipalities (113 councillors), 51 towns (1,035 councillors) and 844 
villages (9,751 councillors).  
 
For the above positions, 47,256 candidates have been registered. Of these, 3,466 are 
candidates for mayors: 21 for mayors of the 3 municipalities, 258 for mayors of 51 
towns, and 3,187 for mayors of the 844 villages (communes). It appears that about 3.9 
candidates compete per mayor seat: 7 per mayor of municipality, 5.1 per mayor of 
towns and 3,8 per village (commune) mayor.  
 
For councillors, 43,790 candidates are competing: 5,214 candidates for district 
councils, 857 for municipal councils; 4,616 for town councils; 33,103 for village 
(commune) councils. Overall, a councillor seat is disputed by an average of 3,7 
candidates: approximately 5 candidates compete for district councillors, 7.6 for 
municipal councillors, 4.5 for town councillors, and 3.4 for village (commune) 
councillors.  
 
This data shows eloquently the degree of political activism in urban and rural 
localities of various types.  
 
As for the electoral contestants, of the 26 parties registered with the Ministry of 
Justice, only 19 take part in this campaign, of which 11 run individually, and the rest 
within two electoral blocs. The first bloc, "The Social Liberal Alliance "Our 
Moldova" (SLAOM), is made up of the Liberal Party (LP), the Social Democratic 
Alliance (SDA) and the Alliance of Independents (AI), which were later joined by the 
Party of Reform (PR), the Environmental Party "Green Alliance" (EPGA) and the 
People's Democratic Party (PDP). The second electoral bloc is made up by the Social 
Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party (SDP-SLP). The other electoral 
contestants are the Democratic Party (DP), the Communist Party (CP), the 
Democratic Agrarian Party (DAP), the Socialist Party (SP), the People's Christian  
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Democratic Party (PCDP), the Movement of Professionals "Hope" (MPH), the Socio-
political Movement "New Force" (SPMNF), the Party of Socialists (PS), the 
Republican Socio-political Movement "Equality" (RSPME), the Republican Party 
(RP) and the Centrist Union (CU).  
 
The table below shows the number of candidates put up for elections by political 
formations and independent candidates (T - total, r - raion (districts), m - 
municipalities, t - towns, v - villages, IC - independent candidates):  
 
Contestants  Mayors    Councillors   
      T     m  t   v     T     r     m   t     v    
 
CP 844 3 51 790 11887 1092 119 1096 9580 
 
SLAOM 678 2 37 639 10234 983 111 964 8176  
 
IC 723 6 61 656 821 61 55 128 577 
 
DP 358 1 21 336 6117 709 111 563 4734 
 
PCDP 284 1 33 250 5246 831 83 658 3674 
 
SDP-SLP 262 3 21 238 4093 684 106 464 2839 
 
DAP 132 - 6 126 2248 425 - 192 1631 
 
CU 126 1 13 112 2072 328 35 308 1401 
 
RSPME 22 2 7 13 437 60 64 142 171 
 
MPH 12 - 2 10 197 23 - 31 143 
 
SP 11 - 2 9 245 18 103 27 97 
 
PS 10 - 3 7 116 - 25 20 71 
 
RP 3 2 1 - 68 - 45 23 -  
 
SPMNF 1 - 1 1 9 - - - - 
 
Total 3466 21 258 3187 43790 5214 857 4616 33103 
 
 
The above table shows relatively well the organisational and electoral potential of 
Moldovan political forces. Apart from the fact that six out of all registered parties 
have failed to put up candidates for the upcoming elections, almost as many parties of 
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those who do take part in elections have a very low organisational and electoral 
potential.  
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This fact is very important given the ongoing debates in Moldova on simplifying the 
political spectre through administrative methods, whereby a political party must show 
every year that it has at least 5,000 registered members. The ability of taking part in 
the local elections brings to the foreground criteria of a completely different order, 
much more democratic, for assessing the potential of political parties. In any case, 
these criteria should not involve the forced abolishment of weak parties as the 
provisions mentioned above stipulate.  
 
However, it seems that for the parties to participate in eventual parliamentary 
elections, there should exist a number of barriers or clear cut criteria for registration 
for parliamentary elections. These are necessary because in the parliamentary 
elections all that parties have to do is submit a list of 101 candidates. As a result, 
approximately 30 percent of votes are lost due to the high electoral threshold.  
 
It is worth mentioning that by the number of candidates the Communist Party has put 
up for mayors and councillors, it has demonstrated once again that it is the most 
influential and powerful political force in the. Two years ago, a few months after the 
communists' absolute victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections, their newspaper 
"The Communist" wrote that one of the main aims of the party was to attract 
individuals of professional and moral weight in various Moldovan localities, 
regardless of their professional profile, whether they were private owners or shared or 
not communist views. This aim was to be attained to cover the lack of professionals in 
the CP. Now, one can state that the CP has succeeded to do this. Moreover, there has 
been a wealth of instances where powerful opposition candidates have been attracted 
to the communist ranks. There is nothing unusual in the fact that the administrative 
leverage causes political proselytism.  
 
Likewise, it is worth mentioning that the constitution of electoral blocs, as expected, 
apart from their positive effects, particularly for the voters, have negative collateral 
effects for the political forces who set up the blocs. Thus, it often happens that the 
constituting elements of blocs fight with each other about which candidates to propose 
for mayors. In most cases this results in splits in the primary organisations of the 
constituent parties. This very phenomenon was invoked when parties negotiated their 
joining into electoral blocs for the local elections. From this point of view, it seems 
that those who argued that it was reasonable to form electoral blocs only when the 
constituent parties intend to merge or enter into lasting political coalitions after the 
elections were right.  
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The electoral process in Moldova as viewed in the context of the local elections of 
25 May 2003 
23 May 2003  
 
 
The first electoral reform in Moldova started in 1993 with the adoption of the Law on 
Parliamentary Elections. The essence of the reform was to change the majoritarian 
election system to a proportional one. In 1994 a new Law on Local Elections was 
adopted envisaging the proportional system for the election of councilors at local and 
county levels. The Law on Referendums was adopted in 1991 and in 1996 was 
adopted the Law on Presidential Elections.  
 
Since 1994, six election campaigns have been conducted based on the multi-party 
system. During this time period, electoral laws were modified for various types of 
elections, as was the Law on Political Parties adopted in 1991. In the opinion of 
several experts, this legal framework was of relatively good quality, except for the 
Law on Presidential Elections, which comprised a series of inconsistencies. A lot of 
problems appeared due to fact that the laws on various types of elections provided for 
different procedures for establishing electoral bodies, as well as for different electoral 
procedures, which did not allow for simultaneous conduct of different types of 
elections and for the voters to get familiar with a single practice of exercising their 
right to vote. Obviously, it was necessary to standardise all the electoral procedures, 
or, in other words, to codify them. This was to be done by observing the principles of 
continuity, transparency, equality of electoral contestants, competence of the electoral 
bodies, adequately informing citizens, developed within the limits of available 
resources and materials. The Electoral Code elaborated and adopted in 1997 was 
aimed at solving the above mentioned problems and abolishing the mistakes and 
inconsistencies.  
 
One of its innovations was the establishment of a permanent Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC) and of its functioning principles. The necessity of an institution 
acting on a permanent basis was dictated by the activities it had to perform between 
elections. These firstly were related to studying laws and electoral experience, 
proposing necessary amendments, conducting civic and voter education programs, 
informing voters, analysing electoral frauds so as to avoid them in the future, 
verifying voter rolls and updating them based on the data provided by the local public 
administration etc.  
 
Transparency of the electoral process was considered of special importance. 
Procedures for ensuring the transparency were envisaged, starting with the procedure 
of adopting decisions by electoral bodies to observing electoral process and vote 
tabulation. Thus, the electoral contestants could designate their representatives to 
electoral bodies of every level, who were entitled to the same rights as other members, 
except for the right to pass decisions.  
 
In addition, electoral contestants may have trustees to represent their interests in 
relations with other parties, and on election day they may accredit observers to 
monitor all the electoral procedures, from the opening of the polling stations to 
completing records and sending all the electoral documents to higher level electoral 
bodies. These provisions motivate electoral contestants to observe the electoral  
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process and to a great extent make them responsible for the possible disadvantages as 
compared to other candidates.  
 
Practically, in all the previous electoral campaigns issues related to election financing 
and coverage in mass media and to the use of administrative leverage by high rank 
officials running in elections were the most difficult to deal with. It became obvious 
that ruling parties were not very interested in developing these items. These 
procedures were not clearly defined in the Electoral Code. It was preferred to award 
the CEC with the right to establish the procedure of solving these problems via special 
resolutions and regulations. Only the basic principle was established - ensuring 
equality of all the candidates. Experience acquired in the previous years shows that 
CEC regulations on these issues often contain provisions only on the limit of credits 
allotted by the state for the candidate, the way of reimbursing them and the amount of 
airtime granted free of charge and for a fee. The CEC is the one to control how these 
provisions are observed. In addition, the CEC is assisted by the Co-ordinating Council 
of Audio-visual and Court of Accounts. It is extremely difficult to find criteria and 
ways of quantifying and controlling the solution for such kind of problems. This is 
especially true in the case of state officials using public assets available to them for 
electioneering, as well as for covering in state mass media their professional activities 
during electoral campaign. An illustration of this is the way state mass media during 
electoral campaign cover high-ranking officials' working visits and the way they take 
part in various inaugurations of socio-cultural and charity institutions.  
 
Currently, one of the most difficult electoral problems is considered to be the 0liaison 
between voters and those whom they elect (this is especially true of the Gagauz Yeri 
autonomous entity). Some politicians and experts claim that the proportional election 
system seriously distorts this liaison. They insist that the current election system 
favours collective irresponsibility of all the deputies elected based on the party 
candidate lists and who are not answerable to the voters. That is why, the necessity of 
changing the incumbent election system is insistently claimed. Last year, some 
proposals to return to majoritarian election system as well as compromise proposals to 
introduce a mixed election system (parallel) were put forward. Still, all these 
proposals have been ignored by the political elite represented in Parliament. On the 
contrary, all recent amendments of the electoral law point to the obvious desire of the 
current legislators to conserve the current electoral system and to restrict the access of 
other politicians to the electoral race.  
 
Such a behaviour of the ruling political elite represented in Parliament is dictated by 
electoral statistics conducted during the six previous electoral campaigns. Simple 
arithmetic shows that the high electoral threshold advantages the ruling party. Full 
proportional system with closed candidates lists, as well as problems related to the 
procedure of financing political parties represented in Parliament, encourage the party 
oligarchy. Splits within the political parties, non-transparent compiling of candidate 
closed lists, which are more like auctions, voluntary change of the candidate's order in 
the lists only several days prior to elections etc. indicate the oligarchic character of the 
main Moldovan parties.  
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It is worth mentioning that in the last ten years no new political leaders have emerged 
on the Moldovan political scene that could seriously compete with the old elite. To a 
great extent, this is due to the electoral system, which is employed, and to obstacles 
set by political leaders represented in Parliament to their rivals. Thus, until recently, 
independent candidates had to pass 4% electoral threshold, the same threshold as for 
political parties and electoral blocs. In March 2000, this threshold was decreased for 
independent candidates to 3%, although it is well known from the previous experience 
that independent candidates can barely pass 1%.  
 
After the Communist Party came to power in 2001, the threshold was increased again. 
For parties, the threshold increased from 4% to 6%. For electoral blocs formed by 2 
parties, the threshold is 9%, for blocs formed by 3 and more parties, it is 12%.  
 
Another example is related to the modifications introduced in the 1998 Law on 
Political Parties and Other Socio-political Organisations. In compliance with those 
modifications, the number of members required for party registration was randomly 
increased from 300 to 5,000, regardless of the fact that in order to include 5,000 
members political movements should be able to promote their ideas among their 
would-be members. The result of this "political spectre cleaning" act is that beginning 
with 1999 the number of political parties was reduced, from 60 to 25, whereas the 
number of the electoral contestants in the campaigns to follow did not decrease. On 
the contrary, the problem of party members' signature verification occurred, which 
resulted in a series of litigation pending resolution. Last year, the ruling party inserted 
modification in the law on political parties obliging them to demonstrate every year 
that they have at least 5,000 members. These two problems pushed last year the 
parliamentary opposition to initiate a referendum for changing the electoral system to 
a mixed or parallel one, but it was blocked by the ruling party, though it was the 
Communist party that promised in the election campaign in 2001 to change the 
electoral legislation in order to make it more democratic. And the second problem was 
that practically all political parties started in February this a year a protest action 
against changing the Law on Political Parties. Another problem is that the reports of 
local observers who provided the monitoring of the early elections of Governor of 
Gagauz Yeri autonomy demonstrated that the electoral climate in Moldova has 
deteriorated dramatically, the abuse of the administrative leverage overpass all 
imaginable limits.  
 
Needles to say, the ruling party and the opposition were in a deep conflict after the 
former first declared their intention to modify the law on local public administration 
and the administrative division of the territory of the country in order to build the so 
called vertical power axes in the state, which means to make local public 
administration bodies dependent on central power. In this respect, the ruling party 
intended to organise in April last year early general elections, but the opposition 
contested this decision in the Constitutional Court, which declared it illegal. One of 
the main opponent of the intention of ruling party to revise the local public 
administration system was the Chisinau mayor Serafim Urechean, who is also the 
leader of the non-governmental organisation the Association of Local and Regional 
Powers of Moldova. As far as I can judge, Urecean was very active in building 
relations with the Congress of Local and Regional powers of the Council of Europe in 
an attempt to demonstrate that the proposal to revise the local public administration 
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 system is a huge mistake. Possibly this has made him the main enemy of the ruling 
party.  
 
The ruling party hopes that the local election more generally will strengthen their 
hand by bringing the local administration under their centralised control. The local 
election will be the first held under the system of local administration introduced by 
the Communist Party, which replaces the 10 existing counties (judete) with 33 
districts (raioane). This reform has been criticised by international financial 
institutions and the Council of Europe, as well as by the communists' domestic 
opponents. To justify their position, the communist leaders have relied on several 
arguments. They have pointed to the overwhelming mandate that their platform-which 
included local administration reform-received in the February 2001 parliamentary 
elections. They have also suggested that the reduction in administrative staff would 
lead to reduced expenditure; that the reforms would help to fight corruption at local 
level; and that the proposed system would offer better services by bringing local 
officials closer to citizens.  
 
The Communist Party's opponents (and many international critics) have rejected these 
claims, arguing that the reforms initiated by the CPM represent a step backward in the 
development of sustainable regions in Moldova. They see no reason to assume that a 
three-fold reduction in the size of territorial-administrative entities will help eliminate 
abuses by local officers, or that the efficiency of local government services would 
improve. They also consider it unlikely that an increase in the number of 
administrative units will contribute to the reduction of administrative staff. The 
experience at the national level-where the CPM had similarly promised to reduce staff 
but where numbers of personnel, departments and ministries keep rising-does not 
appear promising.  
 
The right-wing opposition in Moldova has been particularly critical of the 
communists' local administration reforms. From their perspective, the communists 
have sought to bring local public administrations under the control of the central 
authorities in order to prevent local governments from turning into self-sufficient 
entities. According to the opposition, the communist leadership is furthermore 
motivated by the additional goal of bringing the country's territorial-administrative 
organisation in line with the structure of the communists' own regional branches. 
Organisationally, the Communist Party structure is based on the old territorial division 
that had existed in Moldova prior to the last round of reforms carried out by the 
centre-right government back in 1999. By undoing the centre-right's reforms, the 
Communist Party leadership would be in a position to reward party officials and 
activists by promoting them to posts in the public administrative structures. Finally, 
opponents of the recent reforms argue that the communists have significantly 
understated the costs connected with local-level restructuring. Local government 
experts have suggested that the total cost involved will be ten times higher than the 
government's estimate. Concerns over the budgetary implications of the proposed 
reforms have already complicated relations with international financial institutions.  
 
Another problem of concern is that last year the Governor of Gagauz yeri autonomy 
was publicly accused by the President of the country that he is a thief and pressed him 
to resign. Later though, the former Gagauz Governor was appointed as Moldovan 
Ambassador to Switzerland. So, it appears that he was not really a thief. Of course,  
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corruption proliferates in Moldova and this creates an atmosphere of general 
suspicion. That's why when in the election campaign some candidates or accused and 
arrested one never knows what to think about it. The problem is that other high rank 
officials (former ministers of economy, minister of transport) were accused publicly 
of criminal offences just to force them to give up their posts and then they were 
awarded other high rank positions. This demonstrates that in a country like Moldova 
the harassment of the candidates could be just a method to force political opponents to 
give up running for elections.  
 
The above said proves that electoral climate in Moldova is very confused.  
 
During the election campaign, questions have emerged over the fairness of coverage 
in the state mass media, the abuse of administrative leverage by representatives of the 
ruling party, the intimidation of contestants from opposition groups, and a lack of 
transparency in campaign financing. Allegations against the authorities have centred 
on instances of intimidation directed against electoral contestants and their activists, 
as well as reports from police officers suggesting that high-ranking government 
officials have given orders that Mr Urechean's re-election as mayor of Chisinau be 
prevented.  
 
These allegations highlight the extent to which the CPM looks to the local election to 
help it to consolidate its hold on power-having already won control of the parliament, 
cabinet and presidency in early 2001. The opposition, for its part, is taking the local 
election no less seriously than the CPM, in an effort to bounce back from its 
resounding defeat in the parliamentary election two years ago. The opposition has 
now sought to frame the local election as a major political battle between what is left 
of Moldova's democratic forces and a ruling party intent on building up an 
authoritarian regime.  
 
The opposition has placed particular emphasis on retaining control of the mayor's 
office in Chisinau. The contest for the mayorship of the capital city is seen as key, as 
Chisinau is by far the most important urban centre and a major source of revenue. The 
Chisinau mayoral race pits Mr Urechean, the incumbent General Mayor and Head of 
the Electoral Bloc Social Liberal Alliance "Our Moldova", against the communists' 
candidate, Vasile Zgardan, currently the Minister of Transports and 
Telecommunications. Mr Urechean's supporters in the opposition press have 
portrayed his victory as vital for the future of Moldovan democracy and a prime 
opportunity to demoralise the Communist Party. The rest of the opposition views the 
situation less starkly, and argues that both top candidates have abused in equal 
measure the "administrative leverage", to which they both have access. Although most 
of the complaints filed with the central election commission (CEC) to date have 
centred on alleged abuses by pro-Communist Party state officials and their media 
outlets, Mr Urechean is hardly blameless. He set a poor precedent during his own 
controversial victory in the last local election in 1999, when the CEC criticised him 
for capitalising on the support of the centre-right government in power at the time. 
The scale of abuses during the current campaign nevertheless appears more 
significant than in 1999, and possibly more worrisome than in any nation-wide 
election since 1994.  
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By nominating Mr Zgardan-a relatively unknown figure-as the Communist Party 
choice in the race to run Chisinau, the ruling party has entered a gamble. Mr Zgardan, 
who serves in the cabinet, has almost no public political profile and is not even a 
member of the Communist Party. Moreover, in the past he had been part of the Party 
of Rebirth and Revival led by Mircea Snegur, a former Moldova president with an 
anti-Communist reputation. The president of the country who insisted on Zgardan 
candidature is likely to have calculated that a victory by Mr Zgardan, who can only 
win as a result of his support, would turn into a Chisinau mayor indebted to the 
current presidential administration. That somewhat explains why this campaign 
against other candidates is so dirty.  
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Local elections - preliminary conclusions 
28 May 2003  
 
 
It appears that the current campaign for the general local elections of 25 May 2003 
has differed dramatically from the previous seven electoral campaigns held in 
Moldova after its declaration of independence in 1991.  
 
First should be mentioned the fact that this has been the first electoral campaign held 
under a communist government. Secondly, this campaign has been qualified by many 
analysts and observers as the dirtiest ever. Thirdly, this campaign has resulted in the 
lowest voter turnout. Lastly, in this campaign, the ruling party has received fewer 
votes than in the preceding parliamentary elections.  
 
One cannot argue for certain that there is a cause-effect relationship among these for 
factual characteristics of the current campaign. However, one may not underestimate 
the fact that the turnout rate is a highly strong indicator of citizens' attitude towards 
government in Moldova. Beyond all doubt, there is a correlation between how the 
electoral campaign has been conducted and the voter participation rate. The 
experience of many states has shown that the dirtier and more repressive an electoral 
campaign is, the lowest the participation rate. Therefore, it has come as no surprise 
that for the first time in the electoral history of the Republic of Moldova a meagre 
57.8 percent of voters showed up to cast their votes. This is a negative signal for the 
current government. All the more so as the turnout should have been quite high if the 
territorial administrative reform, which is about to start, had been indeed as much 
supported by the citizens as the current government has constantly claimed.  
 
It appears, though, that the low voter turnout could be interpreted as a protest against 
the dirty methods of the state mass media intent on discrediting the electoral 
contestants, as mush as it is an indicator of people's indifference towards the 
government's proposal to build the "vertical axis of power", which is likely to turn out 
costly and futile. For the sake of comparison, we would like to remind that in the local 
elections of 1995 and 1999 turnout neared 60 percent. It is true that in local elections 
participation is almost 15 percent lower than in parliamentary ones.  
 
To grasp the importance of the results of these elections as compared to the previous 
ones, one needs to bear in mind the fact that Moldova has gone through only three 
electoral cycles since it declared independence in 1991. A sound statistical basis is 
therefore missing. Still, it is worth having a look at the returns of previous polls. Also, 
we should be wary of the risk that errors might happen when the returns of 
parliamentary elections are being compared with those of local elections at county or 
district levels.  
 
In 1995, the Democratic Agrarian Party (DAP) in government at the time received at 
district level a number of votes (50.1 percent) which was almost 7 percent higher than 
that in the 1994 parliamentary elections (43.2 percent). In the same context, one can 
observe that the constituent parts of the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR), 
while in government in 1999, received in the 1999 local elections at the county level a 
percentage of votes (48.7) which was about 2 percent higher than the percentage they 
got in the 1998 parliamentary scrutiny (46.4). In general terms, one can therefore  
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observe that in local elections the ruling party or coalition always gets more votes that 
in the preceding parliamentary elections. The most plausible explanation of this 
phenomenon could be that in the one-year interval between the parliamentary and 
local elections, during which the winners of the former govern, the political life 
continues to be under the hold and prevalence of the expectations that the voters had 
formed during the said parliamentary elections. As for the opposition parties, it should 
be noted that the front liners in parliamentary elections were basically retaining their 
rating in the successive local elections.  
 
This phenomenon is well known both to the current ruling party and the opposition 
parties. In this sense, it is not by chance that the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM) 
wanted to hold early local elections in 2002, exactly one year after they took to power 
following the parliamentary elections of early 2001. Is not by chance either that the 
opposition had objected to holding early elections and insisted that they be held 
ordinarily in 2003, after the four- year mandates of local elected officers expired.  
 
The preliminary results of this campaign, held two years after the parliamentary 
elections, reveal a slight decrease of about 2 percent in the CPM vote returns at 
district level. While this decrease should not be overestimated, it is still a clear 
indicator to the fact that the CPM is about to slide into a stagnation crisis, which 
might be followed by recession.  
 
In the competition for mayor offices, the CPM scored best in the first round of 
elections with more than 25 percent of Moldova mayoralties being won over by them. 
However, the CPM might encounter serious problems in promoting its candidates in 
the second round. The problem is that the arrogant behaviour of the CPM in this 
campaign has left them without any potential political allies in the so-called Centre-
Left Union set up in February 2003. It is so that the CPM has remained without any 
political allies who would encourage their voters to vote for the CPM in the second 
round.  
 
There is a chance that the CPM might now try to revive the Centre-Left Union. At 
least one component thereof - the Democratic Party (DP), registered a very good 
return of 8 percent. The almost 2 percent received by the DAP is not to be overlooked 
either, as in certain districts these two parties scored unexpectedly high.  
 
By all probabilities the DP will not make any public statements in this sense in order 
not to damage its political field of manoeuvre. As for the DAP, one can assume that 
the CPM does not even need to make a public commitment, as the political 
programmes of the two parties are very close anyway. A public declaration by the 
DAP calling on its voters to vote for the communists in the second round would rather 
damage the CPM. This has already happen in 1999 when the CPM and DAP set up a 
partnership and even a joint electoral bloc. Later on, though, that coalition proved 
damaging for the CPM, given that during the earlier DAP government more than 60% 
of Moldova's foreign debt had been accumulated and that a large part of the CPM 
propaganda message had been blaming the previous so-called "democratic" 
governments who subdued the country to foreign creditors. Therefore, one can expect 
that the final percentage of elected mayors on behalf of the CPM correlates with the 
percentage of CPM candidates elected to district councils, i.e. is around the symbolic 
threshold of 50 percent.  
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As for the battle for the Chisinau municipality, one can observe that support for the 
CPM has declined in Chisinau more than in the rest of the country. The fact that 
Vasile Zgardan, the CPM candidate, was supported personally by President Voronin, 
who is also the Chairman of the CPM, has been interpreted by many journalists as a 
personal defeat of the latter. It is an enormous defeat given that practically the entire 
state mass media, both the electronic and the written ones, engaged in a persistent 
campaign of denigration of electoral contestants, especially of Serafim Urechean, the 
incumbent General Mayor. The OSCE and the Council of Europe observers have 
drawn attention to this fact in their preliminary statement of findings.  
 
Although the independent candidate, Serafim Urechean (44%), came ahead of the 
communist candidate Vasile Zgardan (41%) in the first round, one can hardly make 
any reliable forecasts at the moment with regard to their performance in the second 
round.  
 
There are a number of factors that give advantage to Serafim Urechean. Firstly, the 
voters in the Chisinau municipality are relatively educated and those who have voted 
for democratic candidates such as Vlad Cubreacov and Viorel Topa and who account 
for around 10% of votes in the first round, would rather vote for Serafim Urechean in 
the second round.  
 
Secondly, it could happen so that the media pressure exercised by the electronic and 
written state media considerably diminishes after the OSCE and Council of Europe 
observers expressed their concern about the deterioration of the electoral climate in 
Moldova.  
 
Thirdly, Serafim Urechean might insist that televised public debates are organised 
featuring him and his counter-candidate, Vasile Zgardan, where he could show that he 
is much more knowledgeable of the state of affairs in the municipality. Of course, 
Urechean would prevail in such debates only is the moderation of the show is 
equidistant. At the same time, it would be to the disadvantage of Vasile Zgardan to 
refuse to attend such debates as this would make him appear eluding to engage in a 
direct dialogue with the voters.  
 
The advantages that Vasile Zgardan might have over Urechean mainly reside in the 
fact that the CPM has an extremely disciplined electorate, unlike the electorate of 
democratic parties, which could simply forget attending the second round of the local 
elections.  
 
It is interesting to note that the CPM has shown unhappy with the results of the 
election in the Chisinau municipality. A certain anxiety could be read in the fact that 
the CPM has requested a court of justice to rule that all ballots originating in the 
municipality be re-counted manually. If the recount confirms the already announced 
results, it would be extremely encouraging for the lead candidate Serafim Urechean 
and extremely embarrassing for the communist candidate Vasile Zgardan. However, if 
the recount reveals significant mistakes, the advantaged one will be Vasile Zgardan.  
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The Discontent of the Victorious 
24 June 2003  
 
 
More than two weeks have elapsed since the end of the local elections. However, it is 
still not possible to make a complex analysis of the results because the final, complete 
results have not been published yet. As a rule, after the mandates of the local elected 
officers are validated, it takes about two to three months for the complete results of 
elections to be published. At present, all that has been published is general data on the 
results of the voting and the number of councillor and mayor mandates won by the 
electoral contestants at district (municipal) and town (commune) levels.  
 
Although the elections are over, the combatant spirits of some electoral contestants 
have not calmed down yet. On 19 June 2003 the mandates of the councillors and the 
general mayor, elected in the Chisinau Municipality on 25 May and 8 June 
respectively, were validated. However, the relevant decision of the court has been 
disputed. In a series of electoral districts there have been attempts and even actual 
appeals against the results of elections for mayors before their mandates are validated 
by the district courts.  
 
Although in its public statements the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM) has tried 
to appear victorious and totally happy with the results of the elections, their behaviour 
has been evidence to the contrary.  
 
The biggest curiosity is that the results have been and continue to be disputed 
practically exclusively by the CPM, which has ruled for three years, during which 
time the CPM has managed to build the so-called "vertical axis of state power". This 
is the most eloquent indicator that our rulers are not happy with the results of the 
elections and would like to revise them and at the same time verify how well the 
mechanism of "vertical power axis" that they have created works. In particular, it 
seems that they want to test how loyal the justice is to the ruling party following the 
reform of the judicial system.  
 
Generally speaking, the behaviour of the CPM is not at all surprising. During the 
electoral campaign most complaints were filed by the CPM. It was their resource to 
justice following the first round of the elections in the Chisinau Municipality, which 
claimed a check of all voting ballots and electoral documents, that started to worry 
some analysts. Judging by the abusive way in which the electoral campaign had 
unfolded, the analysts assumed that the CPM wanted victory at any price.  
 
The problem is that the irregularities invoked by the CPM are exactly the same as 
those that the OSCE observation missions to Moldova have been constantly 
mentioning in their reports since 1994 and which have been judged not to have 
affected the final results of elections in any significant way. In fact, these refer to the 
incorrect compilation of voter lists, the "family vote" that breaches the secrecy of the 
vote and other violations of this sort. It is curious that it was the Department for 
Information Technologies at the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was responsible for 
providing support to the local public administrations to compile the voter lists 
correctly, which thing is confirmed by the contract that the Central Electoral 
Commission had signed with the Department. Secondly, the state TV channel  
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behaved abusively in the campaign of denigration of the opponents of the ruling party 
instead of providing voter education. In addition, what can one expect of the 
volunteers, employees of electoral offices, of which only 1 or 2 were remunerated and 
the other 6-10 were only paid on the election day as much as about US$3.  
 
Certainly, all these factors may not serve as excuses for the committed errors. What is 
certain, though, is that such irregularities may not influence the results of elections. At 
least there has been no evidence to demonstrate that the violation of technical 
procedures has influenced the results of the election in any district. If things were 
different, then the CPM victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections would have been 
contested by its opponents for the violations signalled in those elections were exactly 
the same as the ones that the CPM is complaining about now. To see this we only 
need to have a look at the OSCE observation reports.  
 
The CPM actions of contesting elections in the districts where they wanted to win but 
failed could have the effect of Pandora's box. The representatives of the opposition 
could approach the courts to contest the results of elections in the districts where the 
CPM won and ask that the constitutional principle of uniform application of laws in 
Moldova be respected. This is a sure way towards the destabilisation of the political 
situation in Moldova.  
 
Another indicator to the discontent of the rulers with the election results is the effort 
of the state media to justify the abuses that it committed during the campaign, but 
which failed to bring about the victory of the communist candidate for the position of 
general mayor of Chisinau.  
 
In this sense, observers have noted two significant things. Firstly, the threatening tone 
that the state mass media has adopted towards the citizens in the districts where the 
CPM have lost elections. These have been suggested that they might encounter 
problems because the political colour of the local power is different from that of the 
ruling party and this could manifest negatively upon the formation of local budgets. 
Secondly, in his post-election address to the citizens, President Voronin actually 
warned the mayor of Chisinau that he would have serious problems while executing 
his mandate. As significant is the remark by President Voronin that the difference of 
votes that ensured the victory of the current mayor is not so significant and so his 
activity will be under the supervision of central authorities.  
 
The municipal press that supported the mayor of Chisinau during the electoral 
campaign reacted sarcastically to the events that revealed the discontent of the rulers, 
and wrote: "those who do not know how to organise a fair campaign, do not know 
how to lose with dignity either". Indeed, the difference in the votes received by the 
current mayor of Chisinau and his communist rival candidate is of 7.8% (53.9% to 
46,1%). At the same time, the absolute victory that the CPM won in the 2001 
parliamentary elections was of 50.07%. Normally, that result would not have been 
sufficient for a vote of confidence to the Government, more so for the election of the 
President or a constitutional majority of the CPM in the Parliament. Nonetheless, due 
to the faulty electoral system, the CPM won 40% extra mandates at the account of the 
democratic parties that failed to pass the 6% electoral threshold. This has ensured the 
CPM's comfortable governing with a constitutional majority. Obviously, under such  
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circumstances, the CPM should have considered the interests of the opposition and 
respected fully the legal norms, but they have avoided to do so.  
 
In this sense, the most curious thing is one of the points that President Voronin made 
in his post-election statement and namely that "as President of the country" he had 
called upon the citizens to vote against the communist candidate's rival for the 
mayoralty of Chisinau. Article 77 of the Constitution stipulates that "the President of 
Moldova represents the state". Thus, it appears that the very Moldovan State, through 
its supreme representative, called against one of its citizens who was running for a 
public office. Or, the Electoral Code, in its preamble, stipulates that "the state 
guarantees the expression of the free will of citizens through the respect for 
democratic principles and the norms of the electoral law". Things get even more 
interesting if we note that this happened after the CEC representatives had tried to 
rejects the complaints of other electoral contestants about the involvement of the 
President of the country in the electoral campaign on the side of the communist 
candidates by invoking the right of the citizen Vladimir Voronin to electioneer as any 
other Moldovan citizen would. This was a weak argument, unable to calm down the 
plaintiffs, given that not any Moldovan citizen has unlimited access to the public 
audio-visual bodies to electioneer as the citizen Vladimir Voronin had.  
 
There is still another factor that reveals the reasons for the CPM discontent with the 
election results. Thus, on the one hand, the election results show that the CPM 
received 48% at district level, 45% at village and town levels, and 41% of the mayor 
seats. For comparison, we would like to remind that in 1995 the Democratic Agrarian 
Party, in government at the time, received over 50% of votes at district and 
village/town levels and over 60% of mayor mandates. Curiously, one of the CPM 
leaders has publicly stated that in the 2003 campaign the opinion polls commissioned 
by the CPM showed a 60% victory for the CPM. Those who conducted the polls have 
proved wrong in the long run and have dispelled some vain expectations that they 
themselves had raised.  
 
Apart from these statistic data, the CPM representatives have all the reasons to be 
unhappy with the election results. Probably, the results that they have obtained do not 
seem to be sufficient enough to build a sound foundation for the "vertical axis of 
power", more so since the CPM has made considerable efforts and unjustified 
sacrifices. Firstly, the CPM has engaged in the extremely costly revision of the local 
public administration system and the territorial organisation of Moldova, which move 
has undermined the relations between the Moldovan Government and the World Bank 
and the IMF. Secondly, the rulers have damaged significantly the favourable image of 
Moldova that she has earned over years due to the fair and free method in which the 
previous electoral campaigns were conducted.  
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